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ABSTRACT
Social contextualist analysis, by contrast to much of the exist-
ing research on international negotiations, emphasizes the
social and organizational environment in which negotiations
take place and the effect that it can have on the decision-
making of participants. This paper applies a social contextualist
lens to negotiations held to decide upon the form and function
of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Certain
elements of the Architecture, which is one of the central pillars
of the African Union (AU), present something of a puzzle for
theorists, given the cession of sovereignty they represent on
a continent where leaders have traditionally been very protec-
tive of their authority. After illustrating the limited value of the
most prominent approaches to negotiation analysis, the social
contextualist framework is outlined. The analysis incorporates
negotiations held to decide upon a number of features of
APSA. Its findings rest upon interviews conducted with repre-
sentatives from AU member states and AU officials, as well as
examination of a broad range of primary and secondary docu-
ments. In highlighting the significance of factors that are gen-
erally overlooked by traditional approaches, a case is made for
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Much of the analysis of international negotiations between states has been guided
in recent decades, though not always explicitly, by the tenets of two theoretical
paradigms, which P. Terrence Hopmann labels ‘bargaining’ and ‘problem
solving’.1 Despite being pitched as competing camps, however, the bargaining
and problem solving approaches share much in common, most significantly an
emphasis on rational actors using cost-benefit strategies to maximize their indivi-
dual utility. Critics have argued that grounding analysis in such assumptions
diminishes or ignores other salient factors that can bear considerable influence
over the evolution and outcome of negotiations. An alternative approach focuses
upon the social context in which negotiations take place, working under the
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premise that actors involved in negotiations are inherently social decision-makers,
susceptible to the influence of their social and organizational environment.2 This
article applies an analytical lens, informed by this social contextualist approach, to
an international negotiation process that differs in a number of ways from the
scenarios envisioned by the bargaining and problem solving schools of thought. In
doing so, it sheds some light on highly significant negotiations from the formative
stages of the African Union (AU) that have received almost no scholarly attention
to date. The data used for the analysis is primarily the product of fieldwork
I undertook in 2017, which involved interviews with policymakers, advisers and
diplomats from the governments of South African President ThaboMbeki and his
Nigerian counterpart, Olusegun Obasanjo, the latter of whom also participated in
an interview. In addition, I conducted interviewswith a variety of AUCommission
(AUC) officials as well as archival research at the AU Headquarters in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia and other institutional repositories in South Africa and Nigeria.
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a framework of struc-
tures, objectives, principles and decision-making mechanisms established by the
AU, in the years preceding and following the organization’s establishment in 2002,
to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts on the continent. Certain
aspects of the framework represent amajor departure from how collective security
was traditionally handled by African states, as well as a seeming contradiction to
the foundational assumptions of the dual approaches that have guided much of
negotiation analysis within the discipline of international relations. To begin,
a short background to the establishment of APSA is provided, followed by
a brief sketch of the field of negotiation analysis. Next, the strands of the social
contextualist approach are outlined, before an explanation is laid out of how the
approach is operationalized within the given case study. This is followed by the
analysis, which precedes some final concluding remarks. Ultimately, the article
argues that the social contextualist approach illuminates factors that are often
overlooked in international negotiation analysis, but which are critical to under-
standing the outcome of the negotiations held to decide upon the AU’s security
architecture.
Background
Though it was founded in 1963 to facilitate cooperation between Africa’s newly
independent states, by the mid-1990s the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
had acquired the title of ‘The Dictator’s Club’ due to its members’ unwillingness
to reprimand governments responsible for human rights violations. The
Organization’s successes, which included supporting liberation movements
and fostering cultural cooperation, had been overshadowed by its failings as
a guarantor of peace and security in Africa. Central to its ineffectiveness was the
emphasis the OAU’s founding Charter put on noninterference in states’ internal
affairs and the sacrosanct status it assigned to state sovereignty.3 Though some
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verymodest efforts weremade over the years to increase its mandate as a security
actor, generally such efforts were highly restricted by members’ lack of enthu-
siasm for any initiative that could imperil their hold on power or subject their
domestic governance to scrutiny.4 An effort to address this organizational short-
fall was made by the OAU’s Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, who in 1992
proposed a reinterpretation of the norm of noninterference, a renewed focus on
democracy and human rights, and the establishment of an OAU peacekeeping
force.5 However, the Secretary General’s proposals were met with strong opposi-
tion by governments.
When I formally presented the proposal for the establishment of the mechanism
and included the notion of peacekeeping operations, minister after minister bashed
the idea and the Secretariat, claiming that peacekeeping was not Africa’s business.
They said it was the UN’s mandate and business.6
The following year, Salim succeeded in introducing far more modest reforms
at the OAU, with no peacekeeping role assigned to the organization and no
real ability to monitor the internal governance of member states. In the years
that followed, the genocide in Rwanda and a number of major conflicts
elsewhere on the continent would lay bare the inadequacy of the security
reforms to which the heads of state had agreed in 1993.
In 1999, a number of critical political outcomes laid the groundwork for the
end of the OAU and the establishment of its predecessor, at the core of which
was a much reformed security framework. Within a few months of one another,
Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo and Abdelaziz Bouteflika won election vic-
tories in South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria respectively. Each of the new pre-
sidents had broadly similar visions for how security and other competences of
the OAU could be significantly reformed. None, however, had reform visions
that involved the replacement of the Organization. The trigger for that decision
also came in 1999, at the OAU Algiers Summit, where Libyan leader Muammar
Gaddafi called for an extraordinary summit, which he would host in Libya, to
discuss ways of making the Organization more effective.7 Although Gaddafi had
traditionally prioritized relations with Arab states over those with his African
neighbors, he had been disappointed with the lack of support he received from
the Arab League in the face of international sanctions in the 1990s. In response,
he turned toward Africa, even going so far as to declare in 1998 that “the Arab
world is finished”.8 Though the reform-minded leaders were suspicious of
Gaddafi’s hegemonic intentions, they readily acceded to his call for an extra-
ordinary summit, happy that the foundation had been laid for reform without
their having to meet the enormous cost of hosting the additional meeting.9
At the summit in Sirte, Libya, talk of reform fast turned to discussion of
replacement. It was also quite apparent from the outset that Gaddafi’s vision for
the new organization, involving a single federal African state with a unified con-
tinental army and government headquartered in Libya, was radically different
AFRICAN SECURITY 5
from the democracy and human rights-focused emphases ofMbeki, Obasanjo and
Bouteflika.10 The summit ended with only a declaration calling for the establish-
ment of a new organization and the accelerated political and economic integration
of Africa.11 Such divisions would mark negotiations that took place over the next
number of years,many ofwhich focuseduponhow theAUwouldhandle collective
security issues. The eventual framework agreed upon for APSAwas farmore along
the lines of that favored by the reform-minded leaders than Gaddafi. Most
significant amongst the changes from the OAU are a domestic focus on the
promotion and protection of human security, democracy and constitutional
governance, as well as the establishment of the AU’s right to intervene in
a member state under grave circumstances, such as war crimes or genocide.12 At
the center of APSA is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which holds
considerable powers, including decision-making over the deployment of peace
support missions, the application of sanctions, and recommendations to the AU
Assembly regarding interventions inmember states. In another deviation from the
OAU’s focus on the protection of state sovereignty, the PSC – unlike the compar-
able UN Security Council (UNSC) – has no permanent members and each seat-
holder has an equal, single vote.13 Despite such momentous changes between the
OAU and the AU, the factors which led to the security policies of the latter have
very rarely been at the core of investigations by either scholars of international
relations or history. Even less analysis has been conducted specifically on the
negotiations held between OAU/AUmembers to decide upon the form of APSA.
Theorizing and researching international negotiation
While international relations scholars have drawn upon the insights of law,14
anthropology,15 social psychology16 and several other disciplines to analyze inter-
national negotiations, a significant proportion of the field is guided by the principle
of viewing negotiations as a bargaining process involving rational actors, following
the lead of research in the fields of economics and cognitive science. Hopmann
divides negotiation theory into two major paradigms, which he labels bargaining
and problem solving approaches.17 He acknowledges, however, that the latter is an
expansion of bargaining theory and that the paradigms could also be described
using terms developed by Walton and Mckersie, namely distributive and integra-
tive bargaining.18 This latter point is made to highlight that the conceptual space
between bargaining and problem solving is not as great as it might initially seem.
For ease of distinguishing between the two approaches, however, I will stick with
the bargaining and problem solving labels formulated by Hopmann.
The bargaining approach, with its origins in realist theorizing, focuses upon
states with fixed and unitary interests, which diplomats work tomaximize through
negotiation.Negotiation outcomes are judged primarily by the utility they produce
for the state, actors’ tactics are assumed to be largely competitive, with threats and
promises employed.19 The negotiating parties maintain a willingness to “forego
6 J. J. HOGAN
agreements that will produce benefits greater than the status quo of their next best
alternative to an agreement, if their potential competitors are perceived to be
gaining more than they from the agreement”.20 By comparison, the problem
solving approach shares common underlying principles with the liberal (or liberal
institutionalist) paradigm, by virtue of its more optimistic outlook on the like-
lihood of international cooperation. Rather than viewing the negotiating space as
competitive, where states ‘claim value’, this approach emphasizes the possibilities
for solving common problems by searching for solutions that benefit all, thereby
‘creating value’.21 Unlike the bargaining approach at its extreme, problem solving
analysis assumes that a state can accept an agreement that also serves the interests
of other negotiating parties. In common with the bargaining approach, it assumes
that states are driven by the motivation to realize interests, but it adopts a more
complex view of how those interests are derived, allowing for interconnectedness
between policy areas, policy interdependence between states, and the influence of
important actors within the state. International regimes and organizations are also
accorded a more central role by the problem solving approach, providing media-
tion, and creating rules and norms that both constrain state behavior and facilitate
cooperation.22
Though the problem solving approach foresees greater opportunity for
agreement and cooperation due to its consideration of a broader range of
factors, it essentially still operates under the assumption of rational actors
utilizing calculative strategies to maximize their individual utility.23 As is
often the case in studies that fall under the bargaining approach, game theory
is also commonly used to explain cooperation in the problem solving
tradition.24 For some, however, the predominance of negotiation analysis
informed by the discipline of economics results in an overemphasis on
“autonomy, competition and rationality”.25 One of the costs of this trend is
a downgrading in the perceived importance of the social context to negotia-
tions. Researchers come “to speak as if negotiation, bargaining and mediation
occur during experiential ‘time outs’. That is we portray such activities as
bounded encounters into which actors knowingly enter and during which
they employ behaviors calculated for those situations alone”.26
An attempt to address this overemphasis on individualistic rationality at
the cost of social context was made in the collection, Negotiation as a Social
Process, edited by Roderick Kramer and David Messick. In order to under-
stand negotiation, they argue, one must take into account the impact of the
social and organizational environment in which the negotiation is inevitably
embedded. In reality, negotiations often take place between actors that have
previously negotiated with one another or already share preexisting inter-
personal or intergroup relationships. Even when they do take place between
strangers, however, there is still a “backdrop of social and cultural expecta-
tions about norms, roles, duties, obligations, and so on”, all of which can
condition negotiators’ strategies, goals and conceptions of self-interest.27 In
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its assumptions, the social contextualist perspective is closer to the problem
solving than the bargaining paradigm, given the former’s allowances for the
effect of norms established within international organizations and regimes.
However, there is enough difference between them to warrant making
a distinction in the literature and to expect different results from analyses
guided by one or the other approach. Studies that focus upon the context in
which negotiations take place consider actors to be essentially social decision-
makers, which distinguishes them from the undersocialised economic and
game-theoretic formulations of decision-making utilized by the bargaining
and problem solving approaches.
Research that puts special emphasis on social context is not entirely absent
from the study of international negotiations, though it is somewhat margin-
alized. Schoppa argues that in economic negotiations between the United States
(US) and Japan, the social context informed the range of ‘legitimate’ tactics that
governments would employ.28 Having started from a position in which Japan
accepted it was in a hierarchical relationship with the US and considerable trust
existed between the two sides, a change in the relationship was triggered by the
end of the Cold War, the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and a generational transition between old and new elites. This created
a new context that was far less conducive to the Americans’ long-standing use of
coercive tactics in negotiations. Similarly, in his analysis of negotiations between
Chinese and Western actors, Faure found that culture was a dynamic social
dimension with significant capacity to influence the actors, their strategies and
the outcome of the interaction.29 In their comparative analysis of negotiations
between different cultures, Ramirez-Marin and Brett critique the theoretical
treatment of negotiations as “strategic interaction practiced by rational, unemo-
tional actors”, and argue that in many Latin cultures, building a relationship
takes priority over materialist goals that would normally be the primary concern
in Anglo cultures.30
As the above examples indicate, much of the negotiation research that inves-
tigates the effect of social context tends to have a partial or complete focus on
negotiation processes and actors outside of the European or American context.
Unfortunately, however, international negotiation analysis – regardless of the
prominence it affords to social context – has largely overlooked Africa. Much of
the relatively paltry research that has been conducted on negotiation processes
involving African actors tends to focus on conflict resolution efforts.31 While
such research has undoubted value, it concerns negotiations that are quite
different from those held to construct the APSA framework, with the conflict
resolution literature being distinguished by factors such as simmering grie-
vances, distrust, ongoing or imminent violence, and more immediate and dire
consequences to non-agreement. The edited collection African Agency in
International Politics does provide a rich analysis of various negotiation processes
across a variety of issues, all of which featured African actors.32 However, in each
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case, the focus is on the interaction of African negotiators with non-African
counterparts. Far more difficult to discover is research that has focused on
international negotiations held with just African governments at the table.
Negotiation theory and APSA
As the earlier background description indicates, some of the circumstances and
outcomes of the negotiations held to decide upon the content and structure of
APSA do not fit easily into the typical scenarios envisioned by the bargaining or
problem solving approaches. The negotiations being addressed in this article
were not concerned with a division of goods, in an economic sense, but were
rather focused upon the nature and scope of future security cooperation between
AU member states. The problem solving approach, then, would probably be
a more appropriate analytical lens, given its emphasis on finding agreements
that serve, at least in part, the shared self-interested goals of participants.
However, while analysis undergirded by problem solving theory would seem
a better fit than the bargaining approach, reasons to question its suitability
remain. For one, a significant cohort of the leaders that so strongly rejected
Secretary General Salim’s more modest security reforms in 1992 were still at the
helm of their states in the period during which the APSA negotiations took
place. Of the 52 heads of state that sat in the OAUAssembly in 1992, 23 were still
leading their countries for the 2002 inaugural summit of the AU. Of the 29
governments that had changed leader in that period, five still had the same party
in power as in 1992, a further three of that number had governments in 2002 that
had taken power through unconstitutional means and a further two (Liberia and
Sudan) had leaders that would go on to be indicted (and convicted in the
Liberian case) of war crimes. Given the make-up of the group and their whole-
hearted rejection of Salim’s 1992 proposal, it is something of a puzzle to under-
stand how a far more radical repurposing of the organization a decade later
represents the realization of shared, self-interested goals. That said, the interim
period had also seen the arrival of reformers at the OAU, such as Mbeki and
Obasanjo, who led powerful states and could potentially use leverage to achieve
their desired outcomes. An analysis, guided by the problem solving approach,
could investigate whether the interconnectedness of states’ interests was utilized
by such local hegemons to realize their self-interested preferences over those of
others. However, the primacy of self-interest within the approach might struggle
to account for why such powerful states would agree to the establishment of the
PSC in a form that accorded no special privileges to those larger governments
that would bear the greatest future burden for keeping and enforcing the peace.
Of course, in reality negotiations follow a variety of logics, depending on the
topic being discussed and the actors involved at different times. The problem
solving approach may well provide valuable insights into the APSA negotiations
that would be less likely to be noticed using the social contextualist framework.
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However, given its emphasis on the effect of social dynamics on actors’ percep-
tions of their interests, the latter paradigm holds promise for explaining those
decisions that stray the furthest from what would be expected of actors with
rationally-derived, self-interested considerations in the traditional sense. This
alternative lens holds potential for explaining ‘non-rational’ negotiation out-
comes that are not easily accounted for by the problem solving or bargaining
perspectives. In order to better gauge the suitability of the social contextualist
approach to understanding the evolution and outcome of the APSA negotia-
tions, a more developed analytical framework and methods for testing is for-
mulated in the next section. Thankfully, a considerable share of the legwork in
this regard has been completed by Jönsson in his 2015 article ‘Relationships
between Negotiators: A Neglected Topic in the Study of Negotiation’.
Social contextual analytical framework
By his own admission, Jönsson’s description of the key dimensions of the social
contextual approach does not amount to a fully developed model. It does,
however, “initiate a discussion of an all too long neglected social process
perspective”, which he hopes can be developed by others in order to achieve
a richer understanding of international negotiations.33 This article aims to
continue that discussion by applying the social contextual model to a unique
case study, the outcome of which serves as something of a puzzle for the most
commonly used traditional approaches to negotiation analysis. Doing so will
help develop the model further, by adding to the cumulative knowledge about its
usefulness and serve as a basis for further research on international negotiations
in the future. Jönsson identifies three crucial background factors or precondi-
tions under which social relations are more likely to become a significant factor
in negotiations. Under circumstances in which those preconditions are met, he
identifies a further three dimensions in which the consequences of the develop-
ment of social relations are likely to be observable. Both the pre-conditions and
the consequences are undergirded by the assumptions, drawn from Kramer and
Messick, that negotiators are inherently social actors and negotiation processes
and outcomes are influenced by the social and organizational environment
within which they are embedded.34
The first of the three pre-conditions relates to whether negotiations are con-
tinuous or single encounters. In this regard, the social contextual approach shares
a similaritywith rationalist and game-theoreticalmodels, which highlight the effect
of the ‘shadow of the future’ in iterated interactions between actors.35 From the
perspective of the social contextualist approach, however, factors beyond the
strategic incentive to develop a reputation for reliability are also at play.
Expectations of cooperative future interaction increases the likelihood of positive
interpersonal relations developing between negotiators and greater responsiveness
to the needs of other sides in the negotiation.36 The second precondition that
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indicates the increased relevance of social relations centers onwhether the negotia-
tions are characterized more by bargaining or problem solving. As already indi-
cated, bargaining scenarios are more competitive and associated with the scoring
of relative gains, whereas problem solving scenarios relate more to the tackling of
common problems and the achieving of joint gains.37 Within the latter scenario,
the less adversarial environment is expected to allow for the greater influence of
social processes. It should be noted that ‘bargaining’ and ‘problem solving’ are
being used here to describe the character of negotiations, as opposed to the two
traditional approaches to studying negotiations, described earlier. The third and
final precondition relates to whether there is a preexisting relationship between
negotiators. Where the rational-choice tradition privileges autonomous indivi-
duals, the social contextualist approach privileges relationships between indivi-
duals, “understood as the meaning assigned by them to their connectedness and
the set of cognitions determining their posture towards each other”.38Where such
social dynamics are already at play prior to the beginning of negotiations, it ismore
likely that they will have an effect on the process and the outcome.
If the above three preconditions are met, Jönsson argues that consequences to
the development of social relations are likely to be observed across three broad
dimensions. The first of these relates to loyalties and identities. Though actors
engage in negotiations as representatives of their state, within multilateral
negotiations that satisfy the preconditions, parties becomemore likely to identify
with a group. A consequence of this group identification is relatively high
expectations of reciprocity and enhanced cooperation within groups but com-
paratively low expectations of reciprocity and higher levels of competition
between groups.39 The second dimension in which consequences are observable
relates to shared cognitions and conventions. Distinct from individualistic
models, the social contextualist approach to understanding group decisions
emphasizes the role of ‘social sharedness’, the degree to which information,
ideas and an understanding of the world is shared by a group.40 Diplomats are
a community often described as sharing a culture that allows for cross-cultural
communication and high levels of shared understanding.41 By extension, social
sharedness is likely to be a key variable in understanding negotiation outcomes
that are reached under the preconditions described above, due to the develop-
ment of socially shared cognitions between negotiators.42 The third category
into which consequences fall relates to the development of informal networks.
Where multilateral negotiations are continuous and institutionalized, informal
networks often emerge between diplomats, experts, international organization
officials and a variety of other types of actors. It is this diversity of potential
members that distinguishes informal networks from the coalition-type groups
described under the first dimension of consequences. One potential outcome of
the formation of such networks is an increase in trust between network
members.43 Another is actors using their network membership to increase
their effectiveness in negotiations by aligning themselves with a powerful
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institutional figure, or drawing upon the skills, specialized knowledge, power,
influence or resources of other members.44
This analysis takes place in three sequential steps, the first of which is to
determine whether the background conditions under which social relations
are more likely to bear influence were present in the APSA negotiations. If
those conditions are observable in the empirical data, the second step is to
gauge whether, and to what extent, social contextual factors bore an influence
within the three broad consequential areas identified by Jönsson. If conse-
quences are observable in those areas, the final step will involve making
a well-supported comment on the value of considering social contextual
factors in research on international negotiations. First, however, comes
a brief comment on the specifics of the case being analyzed here.
The case study
In addition to the general background provided in the introduction, a further
note is necessary here on how the specifics of the APSA case study will fit
into the overall research design of the article. This section briefly discusses
which negotiations will be focused upon as part of the analysis, along with
a justification for their selection. It also includes some details on the type of
data that will be drawn upon and measures taken to ensure its reliability.
Because APSA is a broad framework involving a wide range of mandates
that span several divisions of the AU’s institutional structure, it is necessary
to specify which negotiations, amongst the many formative ones that took
place, are focused upon. The most practical way to make this methodological
choice is to select according to negotiation outcomes rather than particular
OAU/AU meetings, since aspects of the Architecture’s institutional design
were discussed and revisited over the course of multiple negotiations, some
spanning several years. Accordingly, four elements of APSA’s structure have
been selected as the lead-in points to the negotiations that will be analyzed.
Each has been chosen according to two guiding criteria, the frequency with
which the origins of such features are investigated in the wider field of
international institutions analysis, and the extent to which the introduction
of these features represents a ceding of sovereignty on the part of member
states. The first criterion is employed so as to maximize the contribution this
article can make to the wider field and to avoid potential criticisms of
‘cherry-picking’ negotiation outcomes that would confirm the theoretical
expectations. The second is utilized because negotiation outcomes that result
in a ceding of sovereignty are amongst the most interesting to investigate,
given the emphasis that most mainstream international relations paradigms,
as well as the bargaining and problem solving approaches to negotiation
analysis, place on the retention of sovereignty by states. In the context of the
AU and its predecessor organization, such decisions could easily be argued to
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be of even greater interest, given how protective the continent’s leaders have
traditionally been of their sovereignty. A seminal article by Koremenos,
Lipson and Snidal titled ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’
identifies five key dimensions of organizational design that are commonly
focused upon by scholars, four of which are drawn upon here to select
relevant negotiation outcomes.45 The four areas relate to the scope of issues
covered by an institution, the centralization of authority, the rules for con-
trolling the institution and the flexibility of its institutional rules. Koremenos
et al added membership as the fifth dimension of organizational design but
that is discarded here for lack of relevance, as the makeup of the OAU
membership did not change when the organization became the AU, nor
was there any debate at the time about adding or removing members as part
of the transformation.
Manifestations of the above four features have been selected within APSA
based upon how closely they reflect that particular dimension and how great
a cession of sovereignty their institutionalization implies. Scope, quite simply,
refers to the policy scope of APSA or, put another way, which issues fall
under the remit of the Architecture. The centralization of authority is used as
quite a broad term by Koremenos et al, but is narrowed down here to
centralized enforcement capability, which in the AU is most prominently
reflected in the organization’s intervention mandate. In relation to control of
the institution, although the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is
the AU’s primary organ overall, the PSC is the most significant decision-
making body with respect to security. A decision to intervene in a member
state without the consent of the state concerned is the only significant
security decision on which the PSC is relegated below the Assembly, though
such a decision first requires the recommendation of the PSC. The equity
marking the Council’s rules governing membership and decision-making are
of particular relevance in terms of selecting negotiation outcomes based upon
the sovereignty criterion. In relation to flexibility, the AU has a defense pact,
requiring members to consider a threat or act of aggression against one
member as if it had been made against all, which provides an interesting
test case for the rigidity of the organization’s rules.
The negotiations focused upon here are those that bore influence over the
drawing up of instruments that gave legal undergirding to the above four
design features. In relation to scope, these instruments are the founding 2000
Constitutive Act (CA), the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security
Council (the Protocol), and the 2004 Common African Defense and Security
Policy (CADSP), each of which contributed toward a rich definition of the
AU’s security remit. Though the AU’s right to intervene is stipulated in each
of the above three instruments also, the CA is of most significance in relation
to enforcement as it was there that it was first established. Rules of procedure
for the PSC are captured in their entirety in the Protocol, and the conditions
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governing the AU pact are covered in the 2005 AU Non-Aggression and
Common Defense Pact (NACDP). Negotiations took place in official inter-
governmental forums, organized specifically for that purpose, but also in
informal and occasionally secretive circumstances. Consequently, it is not
possible to provide a complete list of all the negotiation meetings held, since
several of them were unofficial and out of public view. The overall time
period being considered, however, is easier to establish, since such negotia-
tions would have occurred in the years immediately preceding the adoption
of the relevant legal treaty. Therefore, all of the negotiations of significance to
this study are deemed to have occurred between the adoption of the Sirte
Declaration in 1999, which signaled the OAU’s intent to establish a new
organization, and the 2005 adoption of the NACDP, the last of the above
legal instruments that bore significant influence over the four organizational
design features of APSA being focused upon in this article.
The data used to gauge the significance of the factors identified by the
social contextualist literature is drawn from a broad selection of sources.
Though not all of them are utilized in this article, I conducted a series of 27
interviews in the first half of 2017, both in person and via Skype, with
officials and diplomats from the South African Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA)46 and the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
There is something approaching a consensus in academic, historical and
media accounts regarding the predominance of Pretoria and Abuja in
guiding the establishment and design of the AU and APSA.47 Public
representatives and government advisors from both countries also featured
in the interview sample, including Nigerian President from 1999 to 2007
Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister from 1999
to 2008, Aziz Pahad. During the same period, I also conducted interviews
with a number of officials from the AUC, including some that had pre-
viously worked at the OAU Secretariat. All of the unelected state officials
that were interviewed and all bar two of the AUC interviewees, opted to
remain anonymous, which many acknowledged allowed them to speak
more freely on sensitive topics. In addition, a broad selection of primary
and secondary documents are utilized, including memoirs, speeches, official
OAU/AU reports and legal instruments, documentation from the DIRCO
foreign policy archive in South Africa and the Olusegun Obasanjo
Presidential Library in Nigeria, media reporting from the period and exist-
ing academic literature.
Several efforts to engagemembers of the Gaddafi family and former members
of the Libyan leader’s regime in research interviews unfortunately proved fruit-
less. Potentially, this absence leaves the analysis vulnerable to criticism over
providing a skewed account of the process, by including interview data from
several members of one of the twomajor camps in negotiations, but not from the
other. A number of measures have been taken to counter such criticisms, the
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most important of which is the adoption of a guiding principle that claims made
by Gaddafi’s opponents regarding his negotiation positions and behavior are
only used when corroboration can be found from other independent sources.
The more independent and numerous such sources are, the more reliable the
accounts they inform or claims they corroborate are deemed to be. Such sources
include interviews conducted with officials from the OAU/AU, who of course
have their own agendas but whom I consider more objective and less susceptible
to reputational incentives than elected officials and other government represen-
tatives. Some documentation from the Libyan regime, such as draft proposals, as
well as official OAU/AU reports on negotiations and other forms of state
consultations, can also be drawn upon. It is to this study’s benefit that Gaddafi
had a tendency toward public and often ostentatious proclamations about his
plans for Africa, as it means there is a considerable field of media coverage that
can be examined for verification purposes.48 The Libyan leader also features
prominently in several academic studies with a focus on the AU or African
international affairs from this period, which provides yet another well of corro-
borative data. Utilizing this broad selection of sources helps facilitate a rigorous
process of cross-checking of claims, which in turn helps strengthen the founda-
tions upon which the arguments of this article are built.
Analysis
The task of determining whether or not the APSA negotiations satisfy the
preconditions under which social context is likely to bear an influence is
relatively easy. Regarding whether the negotiations were continuous or of
a ‘one-shot’ nature, they were very much in the former category. It was
during a debate on collective security and conflicts on the continent between
OAU leaders at a 1999 summit that Col. Gaddafi intervened to call for an
extraordinary summit to discuss ways of making the organization more
effective, a decision that ultimately led to the OAU’s replacement.49 Over
the next number of years, official and unofficial discussions occurred in
relation to the future security direction of the new organization, in some
instances in official forums such as the Assembly, but other times on the
fringes of intergovernmental conferences, within groupings of leaders or at
bilateral meetings between states. One diplomat that was deeply involved in
such discussion said that the debates that took place at the time, regarding
the security role of the organization, “had been raging since 1963” when the
OAU was founded.50 In relation to whether or not the APSA-related nego-
tiations were of a more problem solving or bargaining nature, it is also quite
clear that they were much more characteristic of the former than the latter.
As indicated earlier, the negotiations that this article addresses were not
focused upon division of resources or any other type of economic gains,
but on establishing a framework for tackling the scourges of instability and
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conflict in Africa. Of course, later negotiations, such as those held to discuss
the operationalization of the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) would have
been closer in nature to a bargaining situation, given that issues such as troop
contribution levels were under discussion, but those are not a point of focus
here.
Regarding the third and final circumstance, whether preexisting relationships
existed between negotiators, this precondition also appears to be well satisfied.
Negotiations took place across many levels, most of which involved actors with
long-standing working or personal relationships. Most of the fine detail of each of
the legal instruments listed in the previous section was honed by permanent
representatives of AU member states, each of whom were stationed full-time in
Addis Ababa where they engaged regularly with one another and with officials
from the AUC. On the more controversial elements of treaties or protocols, on
which the permanent representatives could not agree, actors from higher levels of
government – often the heads of state themselves – would assume the negotiating
role. Even at that level though, there was generally a strong sense of familiarity, in
part because of the longevity of many African leaders’ tenures, meaning many
heads of state had years’ of experience in dealing with one another on a bilateral
level or through multilateral interaction at the level of the OAU. A significant
number of governments and leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly from the
‘Frontline States’, also had a long history of supporting the African National
Congress (ANC) in the organization’s years of exile. By the turn of the
Millennium, a significant number of those formerly exiled ANC figures were
South African cabinet members and saw many familiar faces at OAU/AU sum-
mits. For example, the two leaders most associated with the establishment of the
AU – South African President Thabo Mbeki and his Nigerian counterpart
Olusegun Obasanjo – first met in the 1970s, during the former’s years as an
exile. Obasanjo’s first period as Nigeria’s head of state ran from 1976 to 1979,
when he led a military regime with which Mbeki established diplomatic relations
on behalf of the ANC, leading to a long and often fruitful relationship between the
two.51 Mbeki and Obasanjo would go on to form the nucleus of a group of states,
headed by leaders of a broadly similar ideological persuasion, that referred to
themselves as the ‘Like-mindedFive’.52 In addition to SouthAfrica andNigeria, the
group featured Ethiopia, Algeria and Mali, and went on to become the most
influential coalition involved in theAPSAnegotiations. For themost part, the Like-
Minded Five were bound together behind shared positions on how the AU and
APSA should be constituted. In many instances, they were opposed by another
coalition of states, centered around Libya, most of which were relatively poor and
shared a dependence on Muammar Gaddafi’s largesse rather than a genuinely
shared ideological vision.53 Though the members of this looser coalition did not
assign their group a title, for ease of reference it is labeled here theGaddafi Alliance.
While its membership was of a more fluid nature, the states within the Alliance
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included Togo, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Madagascar, Niger, Somalia, Malawi and Equatorial Guinea.54
As the preceding account indicates, a strong argument can be made for the
presence of the three preconditions for the development of social relations in the
circumstances surrounding the negotiations held to plan the APSA framework.
Further analysis suggests that consequences can also be observed across the three
broad dimensions highlighted by the social contextualist framework. Within the
Like-Minded Five, but less so within the Gaddafi Alliance, there are indications of
strong group identification as well as high levels of intra-group cooperation and
expectations of reciprocity. Inter-group dynamics, at least between the two pri-
mary coalitions in negotiations, were alsomarked by competition that at times was
bitter, and by low expectations of reciprocity. The shared ideological persuasion of
the Like-Minded Five’s leaders had led them to cooperate with one another, and
other like-minded states, in building the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD), an economic development programme that started life
outside of the OAU but was quickly co-opted in the Organization’s final year of
operation. NEPAD was originally conceived in 1999 by Mbeki, Obasanjo and
Algerian leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika on the fringes of a G7+ Russia meeting. They
had been sent to the meeting by three different forums, of which each was a chair,
Mbeki of the NonalignedMovement, Obasanjo of the G77+ China and Bouteflika
of the OAU. The lack of interest shown at the time by the superpowers, according
to Obasanjo, served to galvanize cooperation between the three.
They met us briefly in Tokyo, but they dismissed us as African leaders within 30
minutes or so. The three of us went back to our hotel and said, ‘Look, if they had
asked us what is Africa’s programme we would have had nothing to put on the
table’. So there and then we decided we had to do something tangible and that was
the beginning of NEPAD.55
Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi was an outspoken admirer of Mbeki and also
an early supporter of NEPAD, which he saw as providing an alternative to
strict adherence to the neoliberal paradigm and a route out of his country’s
high dependence on foreign aid in the 1990s. In later years, Zenawi credited
Mbeki as one of the most important figures in transforming the OAU into
the AU and standing firm in the face of Gaddafi’s “silly” proposals for the
new organization, the most prominent of which called for the establishment
of a single ‘United States of Africa’ federal state.56 Though Mali was a much
smaller state than the other members of the Like-Minded Five, its then
President Alpha Oumar Konaré also strongly identified with the worldview
of the other four leaders. At a banquet held in Konaré’s honor in 2000, Mbeki
said that Mali and South Africa were not just sister Republics because they
were both African countries, but because they shared “a common and noble
vision and are committed to do everything they can to transform that vision
into the practical reality of Africa reborn”.57
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In addition to their similar outlook, group identity within the Like-Minded
Five was further bolstered by its shared opposition to the coalition around
Gaddafi. The Libyan leader was viewed with suspicion by his rivals, not only
because of his radical (and radically different) reform plans, but because of his
relatively recent, renewed interest in Africa. In a statement representative of this
view, President Obasanjo said: “I think Libya came into the AU strongly when it
was looking for a role for herself after it had found no role in the Arab League”.58
Gaddafi himself was not shy about proclaiming his animosity toward the Like-
Minded Five grouping. At the inaugural summit of the AU in 2002, the Libyan
leader used one of his speeches to disparage the champions of NEPAD for their
promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights as a method of
incentivizingWestern investment. Gaddafi told the assembled heads of state: “If
they (the West) want to impose on us conditions, we refuse that … We are not
children that need someone to teach us…Wehave our own style of life”.59 In an
illustration of the level of competition and rivalry between the Like-Minded Five
and the Gaddafi Alliance, one South African negotiator said that, to an even
greater degree than a common vision, it was a shared opposition to the Libyan
leader’s plans that best facilitated their arrival at common positions over the
future of APSA and the AU.60
Focusing on the negotiations that addressed the specific features of APSA
itemized earlier, further highlights intra-group cooperation and inter-group riv-
alry. The Like-Minded States shared a vision for the scope of APSA that revolved
around issues that had been considered ‘internal matters’ by the OAU, namely
democracy, human rights and human security. The Gaddafi Alliance, by contrast,
sought to restrict the AU’s security remit to protecting the continent from aggres-
sion that originated outside of Africa.61 One of the critical factors that allowed the
former group to realize their vision over Gaddafi’s was identity, and not just in the
sense of the identity shared between the Five but that which existed amongstmany
African states that shared their suspicion of Gaddafi’s intentions. A quote from
a former South African diplomat at the AU illustrates the point.
The fact that it was coming from Gaddafi already made it a ‘no, no’ to many
countries. You had this country, which had just left the Arab world because it
disagreed with them, and you had this leader who said he is now going to turn
around and deal with the Africans and tell them the direction they should take.62
One of the few points of negotiation on which the Like-Minded Five did not
initially agree was the issue of granting the AU a right to intervene in member
states’ territories, a proposal which Libya completely opposed. Mali, the only
objector among the Five, feared discarding the principle of noninterference could
lead to subjugation of smaller states by bigger ones, and included no provisions
for intervention in its initial draft proposal for the Constitutive Act.63 Ultimately,
though, Mali rowed in behind the position of the other four, more out of a desire
to deny momentum to Libyan proposals than a genuine change of stance.64
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There was also some division, although of lesser consequence, between
the Like-Minded Five on the question of how membership of the PSC
should be decided. Nigeria, Algeria, Mali and Ethiopia were all in favor of
establishing permanent seats on the Council for the continent’s big
powers.65 Pretoria, however, favored a system that allowed for two and
three year seats, with each of Africa’s five regions awarded one of the latter
type. The South African proposal envisioned that seats would be awarded in
open elections but according to criteria centered on the ability to contribute
to peace and security, and respect for human rights and constitutional
governance.66 Within Southern Africa, no state would be able to come
close to South Africa in meeting those criteria for the foreseeable future
so, in effect, Pretoria’s position was not all that far removed from the other
four. Inter-group rivalry in relation to the PSC rules of procedure are not as
apparent, in part because Gaddafi’s position on the matter changed over
time. Libya had initially supported an ECOWAS proposal for a 17-member
organ with 10 permanent seats, one of which would likely be held by
Tripoli. When it became apparent that such a proposal would never garner
enough support from member states and the membership started to debate
having a smaller number of permanent seats, one of which was much less
likely to be held by Libya, Gaddafi opted to oppose permanency.67 The
debates over the AU Defense Pact were also less rivalrous. The impetus for
the Pact came from Libya, with Gaddafi viewing the treaty as a stepping
stone on the way to realizing his vision for a federal United States of Africa
with a single standing army.68 The 2005 NACDP ultimately represents
a compromise between both sides, as it reflects Gaddafi’s desire to move
gradually toward a continental army, which he envisioned being led from
Tripoli, while also containing enough flexibility that it could never be
invoked in a way that forced signatories to commit their forces to the
defense of states that had prompted an attack by acting recklessly. In the
words of Said Djinnit, the first AU Commissioner for Peace and Security
and a consistent presence at APSA negotiations, “there is nothing enforce-
able (in the NACDP). It is just a statement that we are together, that we
should stand together to face external aggression”.69
Social sharedness also appears to have played a significant role in negotiations,
particularly those that took place in relation to the scope of APSA and the
interventionmandate of the organization. Surprisingly, given the resolute rejection
of a peacekeeping function for the OAU a decade earlier by heads of state,
advocates were able to bring those states outside of the Gaddafi Alliance on to
their sidewithout toomuchdifficulty.70Of course, the interveningdecade had seen
much change in dialogue around human security and the ‘Responsibility to
Protect’. However, based upon the data observed here, African experiences seem
to have been a stronger influence on policymakers’minds than the global norma-
tive environment. The years since Salim’s largely unsuccessful reform efforts had
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been the bloodiest in Africa’s history, with genocides occurring in Rwanda and
Burundi, andmajor conflicts taking place in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, to name but a few. In many cases, a critical factor
in the triggering of conflicts had been internal matters, such as human rights
abuses and poor governance. The decade had been a learning experience for
African leaders, many of whom felt shame at the ineffectiveness of the OAU to
address humanitarian catastrophes, such as the Rwandan genocide.71 “Rwanda
loomed large as a reminder of just how horribly things could go,” according to
Chris Landsberg, one of the drafters of the AU’s Vision andMission Statement, “It
is because of Rwanda in particular that genocide and crimes against humanity are
a stated unequivocal pretext for intervention”.72 The tragic conflicts of the 1990s
had also bolstered a widely shared view amongst OAU/AU leaders and diplomats
that Africa could not rely upon the outside world, and in particular the UN, for
help.73 One of the manifestations of this was evident in negotiations in relation to
the rules of procedure for the PSC. Although four of the Like-Minded Five favored
permanency (with Pretoria favoring permanency of a sort), the vast majority of
OAU/AU members were vehemently opposed to either permanent seats or the
awarding of veto power to members. Africa had suffered too much, both in the
1990s and in the decades previous when the continent was a battleground for Cold
War rivalries. The wielding of veto power by permanent members on the UN
Security Council (UNSC) was seen as a highly significant part of the problem,
meaning a similar arrangement never stood a chance of being replicated on the
PSC.74 Although debate occurred on the question of permanent members, no
serious discussion about introducing veto power took place. Speaking years later,
Said Djinnit remarked: “Africa had been fighting the veto in New York and would
not establish a veto at its own level”.75 Out of the four negotiation issues focused
upon here, social sharedness only appears to have been a non-factor in relation to
the Defense Pact.
Focusing on informal networks, the third and final dimension in which
social relations are expected to bear influence, also reaps value in analysis of
the APSA negotiations. South Africa and Nigeria, in particular, appear to
have utilized their resources and influence across multiple networks to realize
their goals. The two government’s joined forces with arguably the most
powerful non-state actor in the process, Salim Ahmed Salim, at an early
stage in order to use the Secretary General’s influence over states that were
not convinced by Pretoria and Abuja’s overtures alone.
We quickly identified that Salim Salim would be on our side … Much as he was
meant to be neutral, everyone really was of the opinion that the ideas of Gaddafi
would not work. Salim Salim would use the secretariat, in my view, to push
forward what he thought was correct, and in most cases this coincided with
what we stood for as South Africa and Nigeria. We collaborated and we used
him quite a lot. Of course, then he would reach out to some of the countries in his
own way, to the ministers and so on, who cared to listen to him.76
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Out of the four issues being primarily focused upon in this article, Salim’s
efforts, as described above, appear to have borne the most significance in relation
to APSA’s scope and the AU’s right of intervention. Although the Nigerian
government did not fully realize its ambitions in relation to the PSC rules of
procedure, a significant aspect of their efforts to do so also involved the use of
informal networks. In 2001, Foreign Minister Sule Lamido approved the deploy-
ment of an officer from his office to the OAU Secretary General’s department to
assist with the legal aspect of the organizational transformation, one aspect of
which was drafting the PSC Protocol. According to the former Director of
African Affairs in the MFA, Olufemi George, who proposed the transfer, the
legal officer continued to receive direct guidance from, and provide regular
briefings to, his foreign minister and President Obasanjo after his secondment
to Addis Ababa.77 As was the case for the previous two dimensions, the AU Pact
appears to be the the only of the four negotiation outcomes focused upon that
remained relatively unaffected by the use of informal networks.
In sum, consequences of the sort predicted by the social contextual framework
under the set preconditions are observable, in various respects, across three of the
four negotiation outcomes analyzed. Negotiations in relation to the NACDP do
not appear to have been influenced to any great extent by social contextual factors.
Nor do such factors appear to have borne as much influence over Col. Gaddafi’s
negotiation strategies as they did over those of the Like-Minded Five.
Conclusion
In demonstrating the valuable insights that can be derived by applying a lesser-
used analytical framework to a relatively unexamined set of negotiations, this
article has made an addition to knowledge regarding how such processes evolve
and transpire. A number of interesting takeaways can be drawn from the analysis
and contribute to the discussion that Jönsson sought to initiate on the signifi-
cance of social processes to international negotiations. The case considered here
satisfies each of the preconditions set out and displayed consequences within
each of the three areas charted by Jönsson. Intra-group cooperation and inter-
group competition were highly evident in the APSA negotiations, as were the
effects of social sharedness and the use of informal networks by negotiation
participants. The appearance of a correlation between the preconditions and the
consequences lends support to the social contextual framework’s overarching
thesis that in certain types of scenarios, social relations can be expected to exert
increased influence over the evolution and outcome of negotiations. In high-
lighting critical social factors that influenced the negotiations, this article also
lends support to Jönsson’s claim that “predominant negotiation theories, and
game theory in particular, proceed from an ‘undersocialised’ conception of
human action”.78 Features that are crucial to understanding the APSA negotia-
tions, such as the use of informal OAOU/AU channels by the Like-Minded Five
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or collectively-held shame over the Rwandan genocide, are far less likely to be
highlighted by more prominent international relations theories, founded in self-
interested rationality. The findings, therefore, highlight the benefits that can be
derived from incorporating a greater plurality of factors than have traditionally
been considered by those more established analytical frameworks. They also
support Starkey, Boyer andWilkenfeld’s contention that, in negotiation analysis,
“assumptions about uniform state motivations and responses to different situa-
tions –which are almost always oversimplified – are nowmore problematic than
ever”.79
On that latter point, future research could delve further into the question of
the differentiated impact of social factors on actors involved in the same
negotiations. Social processes appear to have exerted a more significant influ-
ence on the Like-Minded Five’s negotiation behavior than that of the Gaddafi
Alliance, though this claim comes with the caveat that the available corrobora-
tive data on the former is stronger than it is for the latter. One could put forward
an argument that social processes took a back seat in the Gaddafi Alliance
because the coalition was built more on the dependence of poor states and
Tripoli’s willingness to purchase support than on shared worldviews, common
identity or communal learning. Future international negotiation analysis, that
employs the social contextualist framework, could help shed more light on such
disparities in susceptibility to social influences. In turn, this could lead to a more
nuanced version of Jönsson’s preconditions and an improved understanding of
when and on whom social processes are more likely to bear influence.
In addition to making a contribution to the theoretical discussion around
international negotiation analysis, this article pulls back the curtain on a process
that has received very little attention from scholars of international relations or
history. Though research on the origins of the AU and APSA remains scant by
comparison to that which has been conducted on comparable, Western institu-
tions, there is enough scholarship that one can justifiably refer to it as a separable
branch of literature.80 However, nowhere within that relatively scant field has
significant analytical focus been afforded to the negotiations that occurred to
establish APSA or the AU. Of those studies that have granted some, however
small, attention to the process, none preceding this article have drawn upon
interview data with participants from the negotiations. This is not the first study
to claim that South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia andMali played a critical role
in the establishment of APSA.81 However, new insights into their operation as
a group have been gained, such as details of the binding effect of their shared
opposition to Gaddafi and the grouping’s use of informal institutional channels to
improve their chances at negotiation success. The article also counters claimsmade
by others regarding Gaddafi’s supposed role as the primary architect of the AU.82
Though the Libyan leader undoubtedly played an important role in kick-starting
the process, he lost many of the negotiation battles and the eventual structure of
APSA was far from what he had envisioned.
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